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THE RussIAN DEATH PENALTY DILEMMA: SQUARE PEGS AND
ROUND HOLES
Khadine L. Ritter*
"Our fatal troika dashes on in her headlong flight perhaps to
destruction and in all Russia for long past men have stretched out
imploring hands and called a halt to its furious reckless course. And
if other nations stand aside from that troika they may be not from
respect, as the poet would fain believe, but simply from horror. And
well it is that they stand aside, but maybe they will cease one day to
do so and will form a firm wall confronting the hurrying apparition
and will check the frenzied rush of our lawlessness, for the sake of
their own safety, enlightenment and civilization."
-Fyodor Dostoevsky
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INTRODUCTION
Europe has been developing into a nearly uniform anti-death penalty
continent for over a century. Today, only a handful of European states
retain the death penalty as punishment for murder.1 European abolitionist
sentiment is so strong that it has become a prerequisite to membership into
2
regional organizations in the continent. The growing international trend to
abolish the death penalty is confirmed by the number of international
conventions and agreements aimed at abolishing or restricting the use of the
death penalty over the last thirty years. 3 The European Community alone
has published well over 300 position documents encouraging or concerning
1 See Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: The USA in World Perspective, 6 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 517, 525 (1997).
2 In 1994, the Council of Europe officially resolved that "the willingness to ratify the
[Sixth] [P]rotocol [to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms] be made a prerequisite for membership of the Council of
Europe." Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1994 Sess.,
Recommendation 1246 (1994) On the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Resolution 1044
(1994) On the Abolition of Capital Punishment, para. 6; see also Resolution 1097 (1996)
On the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Europe (visited Feb. 12, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/ta/ta96/eres 1097.htm>.
3 See American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8,
1990, Protocol, art. I, 29 I.L.M. 1447, 1448 (1990) [hereinafter American Convention on
Human Rights]; G.A. Res. 32/61, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 136, U.N.
Doc. A/32/45 (1977); Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr.
28, 1983, Protocol No. 6, Europ.T.S. No. 114, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 538 [hereinafter
Protocol No. 6]; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Comm., 4 4th Sess., 82d Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/44/128 (1990).
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the abolition (or lack thereof) of the death penalty.4 Accession to such
agreements is generally forthcoming from countries seeking closer ties with
their wealthier and more developed neighbors while attempting to retain
some semblance of sovereign jurisdiction in the sphere of domestic penal
law. However, for many former Eastern Bloc states, this necessary pill is
hard to swallow. The persuasive, almost coercive, force with which the
major European nations attempt to exact compliance and the sanctions
threatened for non-compliance would, in most other scenarios, elicit severe
retaliation from the bullied nations. 5 The threatened eastern European state,
however, is rarely in a position to retaliate.
Since April 28, 1983, the Council of Europe has demanded that its
members abolish the death penalty by signing and ratifying Protocol No. 6
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Convention). Soon after its implementation, this Convention
became a prerequisite to membership into the Council. 6 The Protocol
requires the abolition of the death penalty in every Member State.7 Russia
has been a Member State since 1996 but has not yet ratified the Protocol.
8
The Protocol is a knife in Russia's side that the Council continues to twist
as a review of Russia's membership approaches in 1999.
Part I of this Note specifically examines the dilemma in which the
Council of Europe and the Russian Federation find themselves regarding
Russia's membership to the Council notwithstanding its inability to ratify
Protocol No. 6 of the Convention. The section discusses the importance of
membership in the Council, describes additional membership criteria and
explains the Council's position on the death penalty. Part I then considers
Russia's desire to maintain its membership in the Council, the current status
of Russia's compliance with the Council's demands, as well as Russia's
justifications for the continued use of capital punishment. The Council has
thus far been ineffective in compelling other Member States such as
Ukraine to expediently fulfll their obligations. This weakness undermines
4 Most of these documents are addressed to nations not within the Community. In
fact, as recently as June 12, 1998, the E.U. published a document denouncing the
execution of Karla Faye Tucker in the state of Texas.
5 For example, early in 1997, the Council threatened Russia with an ultimatum:
either it imposed a moratorium on executions or the Russian delegation's voting powers
would be suspended during the 1998 sessions. See Svetlana Sukhova & Vitaly
Dymarsky, Europe Tries to Scare Russia with Death Penalty, KOMMERSANT DAILY, Jan.
31, 1997, at 2.
6 See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, supra note 2.
7 See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 3.
8 See Council of Europe Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, Protocol No. 6 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning
the Abolition of the Death Penalty (visited July 7, 1999)
http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/l114t.htm.
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the council's credibility, and it may prevent the Council from exerting
pressure on non-compliant states. In closing, Part I presents a case study of
Ukraine's standing in the Council despite its failure to honor its
commitments, as well as an assessment of the sanctions available to the
Council and its failure to employ those sanctions on Member States.
In light of the unique circumstances the Russian Federation now faces,
this Note proposes that Russia should not be given an ultimatum to compel
it to abolish the death penalty. Instead, the Council's efforts to address
human rights abuses in Russia would be best directed to helping Russia
develop and modernize its criminal justice procedures and its penal system
before asking it to modify its penal code. Part II offers three alternative
solutions that the Council can implement to address Russia's current
deficiencies as well as three suggestions the Federation may consider to
remedy its own membership record.
I. THE DOUBLE-EDGED DILEMMA: THE COUNCIL V. THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
The dilemma presents itself as a double-edged sword. The Council of
Europe is committed to the pursuit of human rights throughout the whole of
Europe, and in so aspirig, demands that its members adhere to strict
standards of conformity. 9 Russia, now a member of the Council, seeks
acceptance by the capitals of Western Europe, but is not yet prepared to
abolish the death penalty for a number of reasons, none of which the
Council finds compelling.
A. The Council of Europe as a Regional Institution
The Council of Europe (Council) should not be confused with the
European Council, the European Union's (E.U.) chief decision-making
body.' 0 The Council is an independent regional body whose membership
includes all the members of the European Union. Founded in 1949 by
eleven western European states, the Council of Europe's aim is to "achieve
a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding...
their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social
progress."I According to Articles Ill and IV of the Statute of the Council
of Europe, for membership into the organization an applicant state must be
9 See Daniel Tarschys, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Speech on the
Occasion of the Accession of Russia to the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Feb. 28 1996,
(visited Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.coe.fr/dossiers/adhesion/russias.html>.
1o See Joel Blocker, Europe: Council of Europe -A Leading Gateway to Integration
(visited Sept. 13, 1999)
<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/11 /f.ru.971111154036.html> [hereinafter
Gateway].
" Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, Europ.T.S. No. 51, at 2.
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willing to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms within its
jurisdiction as well as to collaborate with the realization of the Council's
aim.12 The membership criteria as specified by these founding articles is
rather vague and hardly comprehensive. Through the years, a demanding
set of membership criteria has evolved through the use of multilateral
treaties and conventions, including specific human rights agreements.
On November 4, 1950, the Council bound each of its members to the
Convention and has since succeeded in acquiring the signatures of all new
members as well. 13 These signatures, however, represent a commitment to
the Convention as a whole, but not necessarily to each of the separate
protocols subsequent to the Convention which require separate signatures.
In 1983, the Council added Protocol No. 6 to the Convention, demanding
the abolition of the death penalty, and likewise asked that all members sign
and ratify the Protocol. In fact, since 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council has required that accession to the Protocol become a
prerequisite for membership. As of January 27, 1999, ten Member States
had failed to either sign the Protocol or ratify it, including a founding
member, the United Kingdom.
15
Many candidates for membership, especially former Communist
countries, hope to use the Council as an avenue toward greater integration
with western Europe and eventual membership in the E.U.16 It is generally
understood that entrance into the E.U. is hardly an effortless task or a
speedy process. One E.U. official even admitted that, "Joining the E.U. is
more complicated than joining NATO or the Council of Europe."' 7 Despite
cooperative assistance programs the E.U. has implemented for former
Communist states, these states are not yet able to meet the complex set of
criteria the E.U. demands for membership. 18 As Brussels takes its time to
review applications for adherence to the intricate maze of formal
requirements for E.U. membership, the seat of the E.U. also seeks an
informal, undisclosed yet understood approving (or disapproving) nod from
another organization. While the E.U. reviews compliance with economic
and political criteria for membership, it defers review of applicants' human
rights records to the Council of Europe. In other words, Brussels makes it
clear that human rights abuses will not be tolerated, and applicants must
12 See id. arts. 3,4.
13 Among other things, the Convention declares that "abolition of the death penalty"
is a "fundamental freedom." See Protocol No. 6, supra note 3.
14 See supra text accompanying note 2.
15 See Council of Europe Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 8.
16 See Gateway, supra note 10.
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obtain "a sort of seal of human rights approval by gaining admission into
the Council of Europe." 19 Interestingly enough, all individual members of
the E.U. who are simultaneously members of the Council of Europe have
ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, yet
the E.U. itself, as an individual institution, has not yet ratified the
Convention.
20
In effect, the Council of Europe has become the E.U.'s human rights
regulatory arm, incorporating numerous Council charters, declarations and
standards into its own body of laws and requiring that Member States
comply with its sister organization's bylaws. As the main promoter of
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Europe, the Council has
come to be recognized by many especially in the East as the "gateway"
organization for integration in the E.U. In fact, the Council was the first
European regional organization to extend membership to Eastern states.
With that in mind, the importance of the Council of Europe for those states
striving for E.U. membership becomes much clearer.
B. The Council's Position on Capital Punishment
As a European body, the Council's abolitionist sentiment really
reaches as far back in time as the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, also
known as the Age of Reason, was the dominant intellectual movement of
the 18t" century. Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and Montesquieu
were powerful influences for the reformation of penal systems throughout
Europe.2 3 These philosophers shared the Enlightenment's faith in the
supremacy of human reason, believing that people, through the use of
reason, could find answers to their questions and solutions to their
problems. Thus, to Enlightenment thinkers the death penalty was the
ultimate crime against humanity, since they recognized the finality of the
punishment and the absolute deprivation of the exercise of intellectual
19 MICHAEL G. ROSKIN, THE REBIRTH OF EAST EUROPE 186 (2d ed., 1994); see also
David Buchan, Leaders Meet on Rights, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997 (noting that the
Council's second summit in its 48-year history turned its human rights court into a full
time body, appointed a human rights mediator, and encouraged more members,
particularly in eastern Europe, to sign the Council's social charter).
20 See Jean M. Sera, Note, The Case of Accession by the European Union to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 14 B.U. INT'LL. J. 151, 151-
52 (1996).
21 See Resolution on Respect for Human Rights in the European Union, 1997 O.J. (C
132) 31. Issues developed by the Council that have been incorporated into the E.U. laws
include: standards regarding female prisoners, child labor laws, prison standards, racial
discrimination and provisions on ethnic and linguistic minorities.
22 See Gateway, supra note 10.
23 See Britannica Online, Entry for "Capital Punishment" (visited Feb. 2, 1999)
<http://www.search.eb.com>.
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freedom. In this context, some members of the Council of Europe have
identified a serious difference between the former Soviet states and the rest
of Europe. Slavic nations, not having been "imbued with the light of
thinkers like Voltaire," have suffered through histories of "imminent
negativity" noted one member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council.
Today, the most popular arg-urnents against the death penalty revolve
around the issues of deterrence and the moral considerations of using
capital punishment as retribution. Beyond these specific concerns, some
abolitionists also point to the possibility of error in sentencing,2 6 as well as
misgivings about judicial discretion.
At least one Russian government official believes that as much as 15%
of executions were later discovered to have been erroneous.27 The most
famous case in Russia occurred when the infamous "Rostov Ripper,"
Andrei Chikatilo, was arrested twelve years after another man had been
executed for Chikatilo's crimes. 2 8 Chikatilo had committed at least forty
unusually sadistic sexual murders where many of the victims were
children.29 Not surprisingly, this particular case was met with much the
same reaction from both sides of the debate. Even Anatoly Pristavkin,
Chairman of the Presidential Clemency Commission, said people like
Chikatilo are "the spawn of the devil" and "must be eliminated." To be
sure, before endorsing this view, abolitionists first point to the tragic
execution of Chikatilo's innocent stand-in.
Abolitionists also argue about the possibility of wide judicial
discretion. As will be discussed later, judges in Russia have tremendous
discretion over trial proceedings and can therefore limit the amount or kind
of evidence and testimony admitted for trial. Abolitionists fear that judges
may use this power to ride the political wave.3 1 Although judges are
appointed for life, these are political appointments and as such, public
outcry may carry disproportionate weight, resulting in a lack of uniformity
in sentencing from region to region.
24 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Report of 1997 Ordinary Session
(First Part), Executions of Death Sentences in Russia and Ukraine, Jan. 29, 1997, 5th
sitting (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/verbatim/9701/970129pmp4.htm>.
2 See Capital Punishment, supra note 23.
26 See id.
27 See Donald D. Barry & Eric J. Williams, Russia's Death Penalty Dilemmas, 8
CRiM. L.F. 231, 253 (1997).
28 See Carey Scott, Death Row Swell in Russia, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 13,
1996, at 15.
29 See Barry & Williams, supra note 27, at 254.
30 Id. at 254-55.
31 See id. at 253.
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There is very little conclusive data available regarding the deterrent
effects of capital punishment in Russia. If public polls are any indication,
Russians overwhelmingly believe the punishment is a deterrent. If the polls
provide some insight about this Russian sentiment, then, to some degree
one can also infer that Russians believe in retribution. According to the
retributionist view, the only point of the death penalty is to pay criminals
back for their actions, even if it does not prevent future crime. But
abolitionists like Andrei Sakharov firmly believe that this sentiment
"contradicts moral sensibility" and "cannot be justified by any general
social considerations.,
32
Much of the Council's objection specifically to Russia's continued use
of the punishment stems from the country's historical use of it and the sheer
number of executions carried out in Russia. Since the death penalty was
reinstated in the mid-1950s, Russia has had one of the highest execution
rates in the world.33 According the Death Penalty Review Commission,
Russia has executed at least 1200 people in the last decade, nearly three
times as many executions than in the United States over the last twenty
34years.
At its core, the most salient reason the Council of Europe opposes
capital punishment is the contemporary belief that, "[a]bolition of the death
penalty is the mark of a civilized society and a civilized Europe."35 The
Council seems to presume that all European states can fit into one Pan-
European mold, and this, indeed, is the founding objective of the Council,
as well as of the E.U. However, Russia may never fit into the western
European mold no matter how much European-minded Catherine the Great
or Peter the Great would have liked.
3 6
C. The Russian Dilemma
On the other side stands the Russian Federation with one million
prisoners, seven hundred of whom are on death row.3 7 Suffering under what
32 Robert A. Kushen, The Death Penalty and the Crisis of Criminal Justice in Russia,
19 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 523, 562 & n. 155 (1993) (citing ANDREI D. SAKHAROV,
SAKHAROV SPEAKS 240 (Harrison Salisbury ed., 1974)).
33 See Scott Kraft, Executions Accelerate in Russia, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at A6.
34 See id.
35 See Council of Europe Press Service, UK Signature of European Protocol Banning
the Death Penalty an "Important Step," (Jan. 27, 1999) (visited Sept. 14, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/cp/99/50a(99).htm>.
36 Cf. ISABEL DE MADARIAGA, RusSIA IN THE AGE OF CATHERINE THE GREAT 32
(1981) (discussing how Catherine sought to cover up her husband's murder).
37 See Chris Bird, Amnesty Mulledfor Almost Half Russia's Prisoners, Reuters, May
28, 1997, on file with the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law; Helen
Womack, Council Accession Too Latefor Death-row Inmate, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996,
at 10.
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may be considered the most desperate economic crisis of the decade, Russia
would greatly appreciate some manner of approval from the E.U. or the
Council. However, it is also very reluctant to honor some of its
commitments along this yellow brick road to the E.U. Russia continues to
tiptoe carefully and reluctantly around its obligations as a new member of
the Council since 1996. Its major challenge is Protocol No. 6 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Concerning Abolition of the Death Penalty.
Central and Eastern Europe will not survive without access to Western
Europe's markets. Complete access to these markets basically entails
membership in the European Community. 38 Currently, there is some level
of cooperation between the eastern states and the E.U., including the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed with Russia, as well as the
Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
program signed with the CIS.39 However, if the former Soviet Union
wishes to retain any influence in Central and Eastern Europe and improve
trade relations in the continent, Russia will have to take steps to cement ties
to Western Europe and join the major regional organizations such as the
Council of Europe or the E.U.
40
Since 1989, the Russian Federation has recognized the significance of
belonging to "a common European house."41 Not only does Russia have a
strong assertion that "Russia is part of Europe, a legitimate child and not a
bastard," but according to Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, Russia
also has a justifiable worry that it may be left behind in the scramble to
impress the E.U.42 This is especially true since at least ten East European
nations are currently candidates for membership to the E.U. and Russia is
not even on this list.4
3
President Yeltsin is caught between an intense desire for his country to
be looked upon favorably by the Council and his equally important
responsibility to a polity that overwhelmingly supports the death penalty.
Not only would abolition of the death penalty incur political costs, the
economics of building prisons for life sentences is a likewise daunting task.
38 See MICHAEL G. RoSKIN, THE REBIRTH OF EAST EUROPE 194 (2nd ed., 1994).
39 See European Union Press Release, European Commission Makes First Assessment
of Russian Crisis, 77/98, 1998 O.J. (visited Nov. 10, 1998)
<http://www.e.... orglnewslpress/1998-31pr77-98.html>. This document is on file with
the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law.
40 See R. St. J. Macdonald, The Entry of New Member States Into the Council of
Europe, 91 AsILPRoc. 523, 523 (1997).
41 See id.
42 John Palmer, Russia Set to Join Council of Europe Despite Chechen War,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 25, 1996, at 11, available in LEXIS, News Library, Guardian
File.
43 See Blocker, supra note 17.
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There are, of course, some serious doubts among high-ranking Russian
officials regarding the benefits to membership in the Council of Europe at a
time when Russia is not prepared to accede to all of the Council's demands.
Albert Makashov of the Communist faction believes that Russia has not yet
received anything from its membership to the Council. 44 Furthermore,
membership to the Council is costing Russia $24 million a year, and will
require a number of adjustments in domestic law.45 This alone has raised
serious doubts within the Liberal Party about the Council's demands. 46
Nevertheless, the Council of Europe granted membership status to
Russia on January 27, 1996 by an overwhelming majority, making it the
thirty-ninth Member State.47 While Russian membership was welcomed
almost unanimously, the Council recognized that Russia still had far to go
to comply with many of the Council's requirements for membership.
Russia's application for membership was granted even though a report by
the main rapporteur of the Council's Parliamentary Assembly expressed
serious concerns regarding Russia's application after a visit to Russia in
early January 1996. 49 The report concluded that Russia could not be
considered a law-governed state and that it had not yet met the stringent
membership criteria set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of the Council's charter.50
Despite these concerns, the Council voted to approve Russia's membership
with the hope that this would shore up Yeltsin's standing before the 1996
elections as well as influence pro-western reform of human rights.5 1 At the
time, President Yeltsin warned that "failure to admit Russia would be a
serious setback for reforms," and "would be interpreted as a refusal to
support those who are fighting for democratic principles.., in Russia."' 52
1. Russia's Membership in the Council and Additional Membership
Criteria
Russia has been a full member since February 1996, but it remains
closely scrutinized and continues to be in danger of expulsion until it fulfills
its obligations to the Council. Russia has been dragging its heals on the
44 See Duma Ratifies Human Rights Convention, Keeps Death Penalty, Interfax
Russian News, Feb. 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Russia File.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See Russia is Accepted Into the Council of Europe, RUSSIA & COMMONWEALTH
Bus. L. REP, Feb. 14, 1996, at 7.
48 See Macdonald, supra note 40, at 523-26.
49 See Vladimir Mikheyev, Russia Doesn't Have Enough Lawyers to Join Council of
Europe, IZVESTIA, Jan. 16, 1996, at 3.
'0 See id.
51 See Palmer, supra note 42.
52 Chrystia Freeland, Yeltsin Warns on Council Bid, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at 3.
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death penalty issue. In fact, after gaining membership into the council, it
took President Yeltsin another three months to issue a decree asking the
Duma for a "gradual curtailing of... the death penalty," yving the Council
an indication that Russia's commitment was rather feeble. The decree was
passed with the understanding that the provisions were recommendations
from the Council and not actually binding obligations.54 Furthermore, due
to intense pressure from legislators, the Russian Supreme Court and other
government officials, the decree contained no mention of the death penalty
moratorium required by the Council. 55 By March, 1997, an official
moratorium was introduced to the Duma where it was defeated, and
thereafter, the Duma passed a new Criminal Code retaining this form of
punishment.
56
Even if Russia was able to institute an official moratorium or even
abolish capital punishment, the death penalty is but one of many areas in
which the Russian Federation must implement major reforms. The Council
will not be satisfied with Russia's performance until the state ratifies and
acts upon a string of conventions in the following areas: a convention
banning torture, respect for social rights, reform of the prison system,
prosecution of human rights violations during the Chechnya conflict, and
various others. 57 Currently, Russia continues to ignore many of these
obligations. For example, the Council has asked that Russia discontinue the
use of torture as a mechanism to obtain confessions from prisoners, a
feature of Soviet Russia. On May 5, 1998, Russia ratified the European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. 58 However, the Criminal Code of June 1996,
adopted after Russia became a member of the Council, is still in effect. The
Code retains specific provisions that authorize the use of physical force,
even excessive force if necessary, by the police in the commission of their
duties.
59
Clearly, the most important of the Federation's obligations is the
complete abolition of the death penalty as demanded by Protocol No. 6, the
53 Barry & Williams, supra note 27, at 244.
54 See id. at 245.
5 See id.
56 See Vladimir Yemelyanenko, Humaneness is Too Expensive, MOSKOVSKIYE
NovOSTI, Sept. 28 - Oct. 5, 1997, at 11.
57 See Council of Europe Press Service, The Assembly Notes Russia's Progress but
Decides to Continue the Monitoring Process (June 22, 1998) (visited Sept. 14, 1999)
<http://www.coe.frlcpf98/451 a(98).htm> [hereinafter Russia's Progress].
58 See Council of Europe Press Service, Russia Ratifies the Human Rights
Convention, the Anti-Torture Convention and the Charter of Local Self-Government,
(May 5, 1998) (visited Feb. 9, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/actlcompess/cp98/314a%2898%29.html>.
59 See UGOLOVNYI KODEKS [UK] art. 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 (RF).
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first step of which would be a moratorium on the carrying out of death
sentences. Russia did sign the Convention in May of 1998, but it has
failed to ratify the Protocol as of yet. This failure is a significant sticking
point in Russia's continued membership, and the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council has pledged to continue monitoring Russia's progress. 6 1
Russia has made some progress, but it is still far from fulfilling all of
its responsibilities to the Council. For example, the new criminal code
contains only five capital offenses. 62 The five offenses include a very vague
reference to "especially grave crimes of attack on human life," infringement
on life of state or public figure, infringement on life of person effectuating
justice, criminal complicity, and use of violence against a representative of
the authority.63 This is a reduction from twenty-eight previous capital
crimes. 64 However, it is not likely that those five articles will be eliminated
any time soon. According to Article 57 of the criminal code, a life sentence
may only be imposed as an alternative to capital punishment "for the
commission of especially grave crimes of attack on human life" when a
court deems it impossible to apply the death penalty. 65 The code does not
provide guidance to determine when it is "impossible" to apply the death
penalty. Therefore, the death penalty continues to be the punishment of first
resort. With the current explosion of crime and continued public
dissatisfaction with the government's failed efforts to contain it, Russia
faces an uphill battle.
2. The Russian Justifications for the Death Penalty
President Yeltsin took a considerable risk in agreeing to a three-year
moratorium on executions during an election year in order to gain favor
with the Council, knowing he would not be able to sell the proposition
60 See Svetlana Sukhova & Vitaly Dymarsky, Europe Tries to Scare Russia with
Death Penalty, KOMMERSANT- DAILY, Jan. 31, 1997, at 2.
61 See Russia's Progress, supra note 57.
62 See UGOLOVYI KODEKS [UK RF] at art. 59, 67, 278, 296, 318, available in LEXIS.
63 Id. arts. 59, 296, 67, 318; see also Abolishing Death Penalty is Task of Yeltsin,
Gov't, Duma, Interfax Russian News, June 22, 1998, available in LEXIS, Russian News
File.
64 See Abolishing Death Penalty is Task of Yeltsin, Gov't, Duma, supra note 63. The
following offenses may still warrant capital punishment in Russia: high treason,
espionage, terrorist acts, terrorist acts against the representative of a foreign state in
order to initiate war, banditry, inciting disorder in correctional instutions, manufacture or
sale of counterfeit money or securities, deliberate murder in aggravating circumstances,
rape, attempt on the life of a policeman, hijacking of an aircraft, resistance to or coercion
of a military commander plus various military offenses. See Table II, Countries Whose
Legislation Provides for the Death Penalty: Moldova, Russia (visited Feb. 11, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/features/kyiv/tableiiF.htm>.
65 See UGOLOVYI KODEKS [UK RF] art. 57.
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either to the Duma or the public.66 Yeltsin's commitment to the moratorium
was questionable since its inception. Despite the unofficial moratorium,
Russia continued to sentence prisoners to death with as much expediency as
in the past.67 Although the president had established the Death Penalty
Review Commission in 1992, the efforts of the Commission quickly
withered by the beginning of 1995, when Yeltsin commuted only five
sentences and ordered 132 executions. 68 In previous years, the thirteen-
member commission had successfully recommended commuting 340
sentences of 365.69 In a surprising announcement made by Pristavkin on
February 12, 1999, the Council was informed that all prisoners sentenced to
death would have their sentences commuted to life terms by June 1999.70
The announcement made no mention of where these prisoners would be
housed. Nonetheless, Renate Wohlwend, rapporteur on the death penalty to
the Council, was pleased with the initiative 
shown by President Yeltsin.
71
The reasons for the continued support for the death penalty range from
classical deterrence arguments to its justification due to the crime rate and
even to economic explanations. Regardless of the particular justification, it
is clear that abolitionist sentiment has not been a successful challenge to
centuries of public and official support for the punishment.
In Russia, the death sentence was continuously abandoned and
reinstated throughout history. Despite some abolitionist sentiment
consistently present throughout Russian history since the fourteenth
century, its "official" abolition has never lasted more than a few years.
7 2
Elizabeth the Great was the first to abolish the death penalty, in 1753, but
the ban remained in force for only a short time.73 Since then, Russian
leaders have instituted moratoriums or near moratoriums on executions,
complete bans, temporary reinstatements, limitations on executions, and
complete restoration of the death penalty throughout the country's history.
74
Abolitionist sentiment has still not taken root and is mostly an outside
influence.
66 See Barry & Williams supra note 27, at 243-44.
67 See Amnesty International, The Commitment to Abolish the Death Penalty Must
Become a Reality, M2 Presswire, Aug. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16517577.
68 See Scott, supra note 33.
69 See id.
70 See Council of Europe Press Service, Death Penalty/Russia: Pardons Announced
Just in Time (Feb. 12, 1999) (visited Sept. 14, 1999)
<http:lwww.coe.fr/cp/99/81a(99).htm>.
71 See id.
72 See Kushen, supra note 32, at 527.
73 See Barry & Williams, supra note 27, at 232.
74 See id. at 232-33.
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According to Russian officials, three main issues obstruct the abolition
of the death penalty in the Federation today: a) the lack of legal grounds on
which to refrain from carrying out death sentences, b) the economic costs of
life imprisonment, and c) the overwhelming public support of capital
punishment.75
a. The Legal Justification
Russian legal experts contend that "when the executive branch
[through the Death Penalty Review Commission] ... _pardons criminals on
a large scale, it is supplanting the judicial branch." President Yeltsin's
Review Commission was established to address Europe's urgent
recommendation that death row inmates be pardoned. 77 For a few years, the
Commission served as an enforcement mechanism to allay the frustrations
of the Council. The Commission is comprised of mercy-minded
intellectuals who meet once a week to consider seven death penalty cases,
as well as less serious criminal cases for indications of trial errors. 78 As
mentioned earlier, the Commission's recommendations are now fairly
ignored, as more and more prisoners are sentenced to death, their appeals to
the commission forgotten or lost. Even the head of the Commission admits
that "sometimes our nerves can't take it and we drink vodka at the table."79
Given the President's open support for the death penalty and the Duma's
insistent rejection of any attempt to abolish it, it is fair to say the Review
Commission was instituted solely as a fagade for the European
community's benefit. Skuratov further argues that the judicial branch is an
independent organ and cannot be superceded in this manner by the
Executive.80 This point stresses the importance of significant law reform
the Council could promote in Russia to enable an independent party,
whether it is a pardons commission or the president, to conduct a final
appellate review of, in the least, the most disputable or affecting cases.
b. The Economic Justification
The Minister of Internal Affairs leads the economic justification for
the death penalty. Life imprisonment and prison conditions as dictated by
75 See Vladimir Yemelyanenko, supra note 56.
76 Id.
77 See Kraft, supra note 33. President Yeltsin signed an amendment to the penal code
making it mandatory for him to examine all death sentences, thereby permitting him to
grant clemency on a broad scale. See Russia Likely to Keep Death Penalty Another Year,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2198764.
78 See Kraft, supra note 33.
79 See Maura Reynolds, In Russia, Ukraine, Dissent over Executions, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Feb. 22, 1998.
80 See Yemelyanenko, supra note 56
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the Council, would cost the country 37.9 million rubles a year per prisoner
(roughly $1,609,342.00 USD).8 1 The Ministry insists that overall this would
cost the federal budget nearly 400 - 550 billion rubles, an impossible figure
for the government to meet. 82 The flood of crime since the end of
Communism has left the prison system unable to cope. According to one
source, almost one in every 100 adult Russians is in prison. 83 Further, there
are only 1000 prisons and penal colonies to house the one million-inmate
population.84 Some of these prisons were built as early as 1861. 85 From a
rudimentary economic standpoint, Russia simply cannot afford not to
execute criminals. One official estimated that Russia would have to build
five or six more maximum-security prisons to house all the inmates.
86
Today, there is only one maximum-security prison in the country that could
house lifers.87 Prison conditions must definitely change if Russia is to meet
international standards, but each year funds are depleted for other important
uses.
c. The Moral/Political Justification
Finally, what lawmakers call the "moral standpoint" is their reference
to public opinion with respect to the death penalty. The Russian public
resolutely supports the death penalty. Some have suggested figures of as
much as 90% support, and in some major cities the figure increases to an
incredible 100%. Even the chairman of the Death Penalty Review
Commission, Anatoly Pristavkin recognized that "the bulk of the population




82 See id. Additionally, Vice Premier Boris Nemtsov submitted an assessment to the
Duma on the costs of life imprisonment stating that currently there are 894 persons
sentenced to death with 150 more added to the list each year. Nemtsov concluded that it
will cost 580 million rubles each year for their maintenance. See Svetlana Sukhova, ItIs
Cheaper to Execute Than to Pardon, Russian Press Digest, June 4, 1998, available in
LEXIS, Russia News File.
83 See Bird, supra note 37.
m See Kraft, supra note 33.
85 See id.
86 See Helen Womack, Russia's New Liberalism Fails Death Row Man, INDEP.
(London), Mar. 15, 1996.
87 See Womack, supra note 37.
88 See Yemelyanenko, supra note 56. Those cities where near 100% support for
capital punishment include Nizhny Novgorod, Kemerovo, Irkutsk and seven other cities.
See id.
89 Kraft, supra note 84, at A7.
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d. Additional Arguments: Deterrence, Retribution, History and Safety
The deterrence argument plays a significant role in Russia today. One
prison warden believes the problem is that there are not enough
executions. 90 Lt. Col. Vladimir Demidov, warden at a prison 300 miles
south of Moscow, feels that the death penalty is definitely a deterrent, and
that it is the "scourge of our society that more people aren't executed."
9 1
The death sentence remains a powerful symbol of control in a society that is
accustomed to an authoritarian rule that once provided citizens with
security. Today, the death penalty seems to provide that security blanket
that the State once provided.
To some degree, retributionist sentiment has taken root in Russian
society as well. Despite revelations of historic abuse of the death penalty in
Soviet Russia and even in modem-day Russia, the public, as well as public
officials seem content to give convicted criminals what they deserve. It is
difficult to find an excuse to pardon criminals such as Kostya Pavlov and
Vasily Likhachov who savagely murdered a family of four in their home
and then lived in the family's house for a week after the murder.92 Anatoly
Vertoshkin, chief warden at Udmurtian penal colony No. 5, has said that
individuals like these, are not people, "They are animals. Wh should the
state feed a child murderer? We need to get rid of these people."
Europe should not expect Russia to be eager to abolish the death
penalty in the near future. The historical experiences of Europeans and
Russians in the Development of their penal codes and theories of
punishment have not been similar at all. The evolution of theories of
punishment proposed by philosophers such as Voltaire and Russeau and
adopted throughout the whole of Europe were unsuccessful in 18th century
Russia. Catherine the Great attempted to bring the Enlightenment to Russia
only to find the peasantry unwilling to succumb to European thought. 94 She
was forced to abandon her importation of Enlightenment ideas including
abolition of capital punishment in order to address the peasant revolt.
The Russian people still retain lasting impressions of the KGB and
Stalin era where, while the streets were safe from criminals, citizens were
9o See id. at A6.
91 Id.
92 See Scott, supra note 28.
93 Id.
94 Cf. DIMITRI SERGIUS VON MOHRENSCHILDT, RUSSIA IN THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE 248 (1936) (noting that many considered Russia a
backward nation in the 18th century in many respects); Girish N. Bhat, The Moralization
of Guilt in Late Imperial Russian Trial by Jury: The Early Reform Era, 15 LAW & HIST.
REV. 77, 80 (1997) (noting that 19th century Russian reformers considered it both
impossible and unwise to attempt to import European judicial practices into Russia).
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not safe from the state itself.95 However, as mentioned above, any anxiety
they might feel regarding the past is largely offset by the current situation.
Russians refuse to abandon the death sentence as an effective means to
curtain and decrease crime.9 6 Some consider crime the most important
problem facing Russia. 97 Organized crime in Russia is ruthless and
powerful. As much as 23% of Russians living in urban areas feel their
country is run by the mafia which actually encourages its members to run
for elective office. The Russian crime groups take no prisoners, ruthlessly
executing members of Parliament or uncooperative bankers in a Hollywood
gangster-like show of force.99 Many Russians, as well as respected Russian
lawyers, believe that the personal safety of Russian citizens takes
precedence over other personal liberties or rights.100 Given the current
situation, it is unlikely and unreasonable to expect the Russia will soon
abandon the death penalty. Further, considering the fact that in early 1999,
ten members of the Council had not yet ratified the Protocol, 01 the
Council's insistence on Russian compliance is somewhat debilitated by
these members' records, and its credibility is likewise weakened. 102 Russia
is not the only Member State currently under fire regarding executions.
Ukraine is in much the same economic, social and political position as its
former big brother, but to a significant degree, Ukraine's failure to comply
has been much more egregious than Russia's. The Council has handled the
Ukrainian situation with little more than a severe tongue-lashing. The
following case study of Ukraine's failure to comply with its commitments
to the Council offers an example of the Council's apparent weakness and
ineffectiveness in dealing with recalcitrant states.
95 See Kushen, supra note 32, at 530-31.
96 See Despite Abolition Pledge, 70 Percent of Russians for Death Penalty, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Dec. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, DPA File.
97 See Richard T. De George, "Sullivan-Type" Principles for U.S. Multinationals in
Emerging Economies, 18 U. PA. J. INT'LEcoN. L. 1193, 1193 (1997) (noting that Yeltsin
considers crime to be Russia's biggest problem).
98 See Scott P. Boylan, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia: Implications for
U.S. and International Law, 19 FORDHA INT'L L.J. 1999, 2006 (1996).
99 See id. at 2009.
1oD See Victor Shabalin et al., The New Stage of the Fight Against Organized Crime in
Russia, Int'l Ass'n for the Study of Organized Crime (visited Sept. 7, 1999)
<http://oicj.acsp.uic.edu/spearmint/public/pubs/oc/10/01/newstage.cfm>.
101 See Council of Europe Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 8.
102 In early 1999, these members were: Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom. See id. Four of these nations
have since ratified. See id.
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D. Case Study: Ukrainian Non-Compliance and the Council's
Response
Ukraine has been a member of the Council of Europe since November103 •• ,..
9, 1995. Like all members, Ukraine's accession into the Council carried
with it the obligation to sign and ratify Protocol No. 6 of the Convention
and carry out an immediate moratorium on executions. 10 4 Despite
Ukraine's best efforts to circumvent, stall, or water down its obligations, the
Council has paid close attention to the country's record. Ukraine is now in
the awkward position of attempting to explain to the Council ministers why
it has not only failed to institute a de jure moratorium since 1997,105 but
also continued to execute prisoners in secret through 1997.106 Ukraine did
institute a weak de facto moratorium in the wake of official reports
revealing that 212 people were executed between November 9, 1995 (the
date of Ukraine's accession to the Council) and March 11, 1997.107 The
country also signed Protocol No. 6 on May 5, 1997,108 but has not yet
ratified it. Furthermore, serious doubts as to Ukraine's commitment to the
ratification of the Protocol as well as to the moratorium continue to plague
the Council and hurt Ukraine's credibility. "I feel I cannot trust the
Ukrainian authorities any more," admonished Renate Wohlwend, the
council's Legal Affairs Committee Rapporteur.10 9 Mrs. Wohlwend's job
monitoring Ukraine's progress is made all the more difficult by the web of
secrecy enshrouding official records kept by the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of the Interior.' 
10
Such blatant disregard for the promises made to the European
organization have been met with disdain in the Council. However, since
1995, the Council has merely issued a series of warnings, threats,
ultimatums, and resolutions without force. In 1997, the Council issued
103 See Council of Europe Press Service, 13 Executions in Ukraine in 1997 - Now
Moratorium in Place, Nov. 7, 1997 (visited Sept. 21, 1999)
<http://www.coe.frlcp/971650a%2897%29.htm>.
104 See id.
105 See Council of Europe Press Service, Parliamentary Assembly Gives Ukraine a
Stern Warning (Jan 28, 1999) (visited Sept. 14, 1999)
<http:/www.coe.fr/act/compress/cp/99/55a(99).htm>.
106 See Renate Wohlwend, Ukraine: Decision-time for the Assembly, available in THE
EUROPEANS (visited Sept. 13, 1999) <http:// www.coe.fr/magazine/te0198/session.htm>.
107 See Parliamentary Assembly Gives Ukraine a Stern Warning, supra note 105.
108 See Council of Europe Chart of Signatures, supra note 8.
109 See Wohlwend, supra note 106.
110 See id. Much of the information Mrs. Wohlwend has been forced to rely upon,
whether through leaks in the administration or through relatives of executed prisoners,
has later reluctantly been admitted by Ukrainian authorities who initially swiftly dismiss
the rumors. See id.
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Resolution 1112 whereby it demanded Ukrainian compliance, warning that
it would "take all necessary steps to ensure compliance" and even "consider
the non-ratification of the credentials of the Ukrainian parliamentary
delegation."' 111 Likewise in December 1998, the Council warned the
Ukrainian delegation that it might be excluded from the Parliamentary
Assembly in January 1999 due to failed compliance with the
moratorium.112 This, too, was an empty threat. Again, in December 1998,
the Parliamentary Assembly Monitoring Committee adopted a draft
resolution and recommendation urging the Assembly to annul the Ukrainian
delegation's credentials and examine a possible suspension if Ukraine's
commitments were not honored by June 1999.113 In yet another resolution
in 1998, the Council not only continued to demand the complete abolition
of the death penalty as well as a de jure moratorium, it also gave Ukraine
specific instructions for reform of its prison system.1 14 These numerous
threats, resolutions and warnings have made little impact on Ukraine's
continued course of conduct.
In spite of tremendous discontent with Ukraine's record, the Assembly
once again approved the delegation's credentials at the January 1998
meeting and opted instead to warn Ukraine that next time their credentials
could be revoked.115 More recently, in January 1999, the Parliamentary
Assembly unanimously decided that it would annul Ukraine's credentials
and call for a suspension of the Ukrainian representation in the Committee
of Ministers at the June 1999 session unless the country made substantial
progress to fulfill its obligations.
1 16
After more than three years of futile demands, the Council's credibility
has been called into question by its own members. Wohlwend has claimed
that the Council "always prefer[s] political dialogue to sanctions, but there
are limits." 117 These limits have not yet been made apparent. Even
Wohlwend admits that "the Assembly must show that it does not accept to
11 Resolution 1112 (1997) On the Honouring of the Commitment Entered Into by
Ukraine Upon Accession to the Council of Europe to Put into Place a Moratorium on
Executions (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/ta/ta97/eres 112.htm>.
112 See Council of Europe Press Service, Monitoring Committee Warning to Ukraine,
Dec. 2, 1998 (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http:llwww.coe.fr/cp1981780a%2898%29.htm>.
13 See id.
114 See Resolution 1145 (1998) Execution in Ukraine (visited Sept. 13, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/ta/ta98/eres 1145.htm>.
115 See Council of Europe Press Service, Assembly Gives Ukraine Final Warning on
Executions, Jan. 27, 1998 (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http'/www.coe.fr/cp/98/50a(98).htm>.
116 See Council of Europe Press Service, Parliamentary Assembly Gives Ukraine a
Stern Warning, Jan. 28, 1999 (visited Sept. 21, 1999)
<http:lwww.coe.fr/cp199155a(99).htm>.
117 See Council of Europe Press Service, Warning to Ukraine (Dec. 16, 1997) (visited
Sept. 14, 1999) <http:lwww.coe.fr/cp/971746a(97).htm>.
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be lied to .... It is not enough to issue another warning; this would
endanger the Assembly's credibility. ' ' 118 During an emergency debate in
January 1997, considering the failed commitments by Ukraine and Russia,
several members of the Parliamentary Assembly pointed out that until the
Council takes substantive steps against such disregarded obligations, other
countries would also be unwilling to comply with the Protocol or enter into
agreements in the future. 119 Other members of the Council also noted the
risk that continuing executions might undermine the credibility and
integrity of the organization on the question of human rights.
120
The case of Ukraine is exemplary of the situation of other new
Member States. Not surprisingly, of the ten members who have not yet
ratified the Protocol, nine of them are in the midst of a transitional phase
between Communism and democracy. 12 1 At least one member of the
Council has recognized the political difficulties these former Soviet states
face and the impact the immediate abolition of the death penalty would
produce. 122 One member of the Italian delegation to the Assembly even
admitted that, "Asking Russia and Ukraine to abolish the death sentence
tomorrow would be like asking them to get rid of their governments
tomorrow." 
12 3
If the Council's own record of legislative proceedings is any indication
of its strength of character, members such as Russia and Ukraine have little
to fear. No Member State has ever been expelled for any reason
whatsoever. Further, no Member State has ever had its credentials
suspended at any moment. The mechanism by which to suspend or expel
members is written into the founding Statute of the Council of Europe, but
it has never been employed. Article VIII authorizes the suspension of any
state which has "seriously violated Article II" which states:
Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the
rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and
effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council as specified in
Chapter 1.124
Article VIII also permits the Committee of Ministers to request the
Member State to withdraw pursuant to Article VII. 12 5 If the member then
refuses to withdraw, Article VIII grants the Committee the power to declare
118 Wohlwend, supra note 106.
119 See Executions of Death Sentences in Russia and Ukraine, supra note 24.
120 See id.
121 See Council of Europe Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 8.
122 See Execution of Death Sentences in Russia and Ukraine, supra note 24.
123 Id.
124 Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, Europ. T.S. No. 51, art. 3.
125 See id art. 8.
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that the member has "ceased to be a Member of the Council." 126 It seems
the Council has had ample and fully justified opportunities to utilize the
language of Article III to demonstrate cause for suspension or expulsion of
members such as Ukraine under Article VIII. The fact that it has never
employed Article VIII calls into question the Council's commitment to its
founding Statute and its bylaws.
In light of the number of conventions, agreements and other
fundamental documents that many members have not yet signed and/or
ratified, the Council's unwillingness to employ Article VIII justifies many
members' nearly lethargic fulfillment of obligations. Some of the unsigned
or unratified conventions date as far back as 1961 such as the European
Social Charter, which to this date has not yet been signed by nine members
nor ratified by eighteen states including Switzerland.12 7 Other conventions
that have not been signed or ratified by some members concern the very
human rights the organization was formed to protect. For example, six
years after its opening for signature, Italy had not yet ratified Protocol No. 1
to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. l12 Additionally, seventeen members
including seven founding states, have not signed or ratified the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 129 Not only have
some members failed to sign or ratify fundamental human rights
agreements, there are some conventions that have been signed only by a
minority of states. One such agreement is the European Convention on the
Exercise of Children's Rights which has only been signed by fourteen of
the forty members. 13 Finally, there are scores of treaties that even the
founding members have failed to ratify. 31 These treaties go as far back as
12 Id.
127 See Council of Europe: Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, European Social
Charter, ETS No. 35, (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/35t.htm>.
12 See Council of Europe Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, Protocol No. 1 to the
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, ETS No. 151, (visited March 15, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/114t.htm>. Italy has since then ratified the Protocol. See id.
129 See Council of Europe: Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ETS No. 157, (visited Sept. 21,
1999) <http:l/www.coe.fr/tablconv/157t.htm>.
130 See Council of Europe: Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, European
Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights, ETS No. 160, (visited March 15, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/160t.htm>.
'3' See Treaties of the Council of Europe Signed but Not Ratified by Belgium (last
modified June 23, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/signstates/esignbelg.htm>;
Treaties of the Council of Europe Signed But Not Ratified by France (last modified Sept.
9, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/signstates/esignfra.htm>; Treaties of the
Council of Europe Signed But Not Ratified by the United Kingdom (last modified June.
23, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/signstates/esignuk.htm>; Treaties of the
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1955 and range from issues regarding the social protection of farmers to
agreements regarding illicit traffic of narcotic drugs by sea.
132
The absence of signatures and ratifications is not solely the failure of
the individual Member States, but of the parent organization as well. If the
Council is not willing or able to compel some of its own founding members
as well as the entire membership to fulfill their obligations, it will not
succeed in asking newer members to commit themselves to the Council's
agenda. The provisions of Article 8 should be used sparingly and carefully,
but they certainly should not be ignored. Once the Council has so exhausted
its means of persuasion, it should seek alternative solutions to the problem
or simply commence measures pursuant to Article 8. In so doing and by
eliminating useless and countless threats and ultimatums, the Council can
avoid questions of credibility. If the Council continues its current course of
action, however, it may be reduced to an institution with little more than a
weak soapbox from which to beg cooperation from its members.
133
The following section will outline the alternatives to a complete and
immediate abolition of the death penalty in the Russian Federation. These
are options that either the Council or the Russian Federation or both may
take in efforts to move Russia closer to a "European model."
II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE DILEMMA
A. Possible Council Responses
The first set of alternatives involves the Council's approach to Russia.
It should be noted that the easiest solution is not the suspension of Russia's
membership under Article 8 as previously discussed. Indeed, despite the
death penalty3issue, the majority of Member States do support Russia's
membership. Furthermore, suspension will not move Russia closer to
abolishing the death penalty.
1. Eliminate the Requirement to Abolish the Death Penalty
The easiest but least likely solution to the Council's dilemma is for the
Council to simply eliminate the requirement that Russia abolish the death
penalty. This, of course, poses several problems for the Council. There are
already reports that Council members feel the organization is diluting its
entrance criteria and offering membership to countries that are clearly not
yet qualified. If the Council eliminates this obligation altogether, it would
Council of Europe Signed But Not Ratified by Italy (last modified Aug. 11, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/signstates/esignita.htm>.
132 See supra note 131.
133 See Adrian Porter, Russia Joins Council of Europe, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Feb. 29, 1996.
134 See Macdonald, supra note 40, at 525.
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have to afford each country the ability to rescind its obligation. Even
without these concerns, in truth, this organization is purely a human rights
institution, and currently at its core is the belief in freedom from the death
penalty. The question would then become, what kind of credibility will the
Council expect to retain if it abolishes an ideal which has for the past ten
years been an overriding concern and is embodied in a legal instrument by
which each member is bound?
2. Relaxing Russia's Membership Criteria
The second response to- the problem is to ask that the Council
temporarily relax its criteria for Russia. The Russian Federation has openly
stated that it desires closer cooperation with the West and further
integration into the European family. Russia's ultimate goal continues to be
entrance into the E.U. If this is true, there is little doubt that Russia will do
everything in its power, commensurate with its desire to join the E.U., to
meet its obligations. If the Council remains determined to demand the
abolition of the death penalty and is willing to help Russia accomplish this,
Russia will achieve it. However, there can be no ultimatum.
The Council's continued demands and ultimatums are useless.
Currently, Russia has until 1999 to abolish the death penalty or be expelled
from the Council. 135 Russia is not yet in a position to abolish the death
penalty. Rather than aid Russia toward a greater respect for human rights,
such ultimatums serve to aggravate an already tense political situation and
threaten societal instability. Further, ultimatums are ignored, and therefore,
their credibility when later used is nullified. A threat is only as good as it is
credible. As was illustrated by the case study on Ukraine, three years of
threats and warnings have done little to change the situation.
An even more troublesome situation currently testing the Council's
resolve to demand compliance from members are the recent statements by
Albanian officials rescinding their commitments to abolish the death
penalty by June 1999.136 This country has not ratified the Protocol, but it
did institute a de facto moratorium on execution upon its accession in
1995.137 Albanian Justice Minister Thimjo Kondi said his government
wants to keep the death penalty as a deterrent and will negotiate with the
Council, so that they understand that, given the current situation in Albania,
abolition is not feasible. The situation in Albania is currently more
135 See Capital Punishment in Russia Survives Trend To Eliminate It, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, Sept. 21, 1997.
136 See Albania Reluctant to Kill Off Death Penalty, Central Europe Online, Feb. 4,
1999, (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/roundup/albfullO1.
html>.
137 See Resolution 1114(1997) On the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by
Albania (visited Feb. 7, 1999) < http://stars.coe.fr/indexe.htm >.
138 See Albania Reluctant to Kill Off Death Penalty, supra note 136.
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critical than in Russia. 139 In fact, the unrest and open violence in that
country is so disturbing that even Mrteza Gjoko, the only Albanian
currently on death row, says Albania should not abolish the death
penalty. 14  Needless to say, the Council ministers are concerned and have
issued a press release urging Albania to continue to uphold the current
moratorium, saying that "any step back on this commitment would have
serious consequences for Albania's membership .... 141 Thus begins what
will probably be the first in a series of threats, ultimatums, and resolutions
concerning Albania's future as a member.
It is true that the Council gave Russia three years to completely abolish
the use of executions. 142 What the Council did not take into account is that
at the time that promise was made, there was an election on the horizon in
Moscow. This should not suggest that the value of a promise is dependent
upon the situation in which it was given. However, the Council should at
least note that it would have been political suicide to insist on the abolition
of the death penalty when one of Yeltsin's radical opponents, Vladimir
Zhririnovsky was promising to execute all gangsters.I13 The implications
for further cooperation with the West had Zhririnovsky been elected are
unfathomable. 144 During this particular election year when crime was at a
peak, the death penalty issue alone could have cost Yeltsin the presidency.
Without Russian membership and Yeltsin's cooperation the Council would
have no future influence over Russia, thereby missing its opportunity and
mission in that country. It may take Russia longer than the Council would
hope, but without the pressure of its membership obligations, Russia may
never reach for abolition. Conversely, if the Council persists unreasonably
139 Much like Russia, polls suggest that an overwhelming number of Albanians
support the capital punishment. Albania's entire prison population escaped in 1998
during the civil unrest. See id.
'40 See id.
141 Council of Europe Press Service, Albania: Parliamentary Assembly Concerned
(Feb. 1, 1999) (visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/cp/99/20a(99).htm>.
142 See David Hoffman, Yeltsin Moves Gingerly to End Death Penalty, WASH. POST,
May 17, 1996, at A27.
143 See Womack, supra note 86.
144 The German press has gone so far as to call Zhirinovsky "Russia's Hitler." See
Kevin Fedarko, Hello, I Must Be Going, TIME, Jan. 10, 1994, at 34. Zhirinovsky is a
flamboyant nationalist who has promised to reclaim Alaska for Russia once he is elected
president. See id. at 34-35. He is also an anti-Semite, angering the Anti-Defamation
League when he proclaimed that "to survive" Russia and the U.S. could "set aside places
in United States and Russian territory to deport this small but troublesome tribe." ADL
Outraged by Zhirinovsky's Call for Jewish Deportation, Press Release, Feb. 23, 1999
(visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.adl.org/presrele/asint_13/2677_13.html>.
Additionally, he is well-known for his passionate outbursts against Yeltsin and the
United States. See Daniel Williams, Zhirinovsky Aid Mission: Comic Relief, SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at A3.
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it may push Russia further away from achieving the Council's goals.
Therefore, a better solution to the Council's frustration is to relax its
membership criteria for Russia. A relaxation of the obligations could entail
an extension of the deadline set by the Council for the complete abolition of
the death penalty along with further reductions in the number of crimes for
which the punishment is used.
3. New Focus on Penal and Criminal Justice Reform
If Russia commuted all death sentences to life imprisonment
tomorrow, what would it then do with those lifers? Where would they be
housed? If housed in the other, already overcrowded prisons, would that not
be a graver transgression of already shameful human rights violations?
Therefore, the third possible solution is for the Council to shift the focus
from the death penalty to penal and criminal justice reform.
While the death penalty is the salient issue for the Council, there are a
myriad of other obligations Russia must also fulfill and to date is ignoring.
Many of these criteria are issues that must be resolved before further
discussion of the abolishment of the death penalty can proceed. For
example, the Council has placed a premium on the abolition of the death
penalty but has only left to a secondary role the restructuring of the penal
system itself. The Council is attempting to skip a step toward abolition of
capital punishment without first implementing an infrastructure to uphold
and provide permanence for that step.
If the Council is truly committed to human rights in Russia as well as
the abolition of the death penalty, there are a number of initial steps the
Council should help Russia achieve before asking its government to ignore
the overriding will of the Russian people. The process must begin with
reform of the penal system and the criminal justice systems. Indeed, in very
practical terms, Russia is still physically unable to attain the Council's lofty
abolition goal. As will be explained below, there is much work to be done
in Russia. The Council can take an active role in remedying Russia's
situation. Indeed, as the bastion of human rights in Europe, the Council has
an obligation to help its newest member achieve the goals of the
organization.
B. Proposals for Russia's Approach
Russia also has three options with which to address the Council's
concerns, the first of which is highly unlikely. Russia's success will rest on
the second suggestion which will entail the greatest commitment on
Russia's part as well as extraordinary patience by the Council.
1. Abolition of Capital Punishment
The first is an obvious solution, and that is to abolish the death penalty.
Not only is this economically impossible, it is politically implausible. The
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elections in 1999 will probably not alter the political climate enough to
encourage government officials to abolish capital punishment. Unless there
is a sharp decrease in crime as well as rapid improvement in the prison
system, Russian society will continue to opt for the death penalty as the
appropriate punishment for the most heinous crimes.
2. Complete Reform of Russia's Prison and Criminal Justice
Systems
The second option is to take steps to reform both its prison system and
its criminal justice system, thereby addressing at least some of the
Council's secondary concerns. Without these reforms the country cannot
advance to the Council's ultimate objective. Russia has a wealth of
knowledge and resources available within its own borders. Numerous non-
governmental and nonprofit organizations as well as human rights groups,
educators and clergy can be employed to assist in the criminal reform
projects in the same manner in which they contributed to the development
of the new constitution in 1993.
In September 1998, Russia took a step in reforming its prison system
to the extent that it sought to decrease police cruelty toward prisoners. The
government removed the prison system from the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of the Interior, which oversees the police, and placed it under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice instead.'4 5 Various human rights
organizations had advocated this change in the hope that the use of torture
by the police to extract confessions or testimonies for criminal cases would
decrease. 146 Russia also signed and ratified the Council's convention
against torture in 1997, which gives international inspectors the right to
examine prisons and detention centers for abuses of power and signs of
torture. 14 This problem is persistent in Russia, and this will be the first
time the issue will be addressed. The Criminal Code itself contains only a
brief definition of torture although it does forbid it.148 Further, in 1997
alone there were 27,155 complaints against abusive police action including
murder, rape and premeditated bodily harm. 149 Some commentators have
suggested that these abuses stem from police detectives' lack of training as
well as a lack of psychological screening for new officers. 150 Russia must
145 See Russia Proposes Penal Amnesty That May Free 100,000 Prisoners, BALT. SUN,
Oct. 7, 1998, at 16A.
146 See generally Natalya Shulyakovskaya, Kremlin Committee Tackles Police
Torture, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 8, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Russia File
(noting that human rights groups advocate change in police procedures and training
aimed at reducing the use of torture).
147 See id.
148 See UGOLOVYI KODEKS [UK RF] art. 113.
149 See Shulyakovskaya, supra note 146.
150 See id.
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take steps to follow up on these complaints as well as to ensure that
mechanisms are in place whereby citizens can file complaints with
receptive officials. Furthermore, the government can implement specific
guidelines for the detention of citizens, interrogation rules and arrest
procedures such as Miranda warnings.
Prison conditions in Russia are so alarming, some say that it is better
to die than to live in prison. Anatoly Pristavkin, chairman of the president's
Review Commission, considers life in prison "a delayed death sentence.,
151
In fact, Pristavkin claims that some prisoners ask to be put to death instead
152
of being pardoned and sent to prison. Prisons in Russia are overcrowded
and disease-infested. Prisoners are forced to share beds, sleeping in
shifts.153 As many as fifty percent of inmates are believed to be infected
with tuberculosis. 14 In Moscow's largest and most infamous detention
center, Matrosskaya Tishina, one prisoner claimed he would prefer a labor
camp to prison. 155 Valery Abramkin, a leading human rights activist in
Moscow who spent six years in a Soviet prison, insists that even in Soviet
prisons under Stalin, the conditions did not compare to what inmates
experience today.15 6 As of 1997, inmates are now entitled to forty-three
square feet of space, an increase from twenty-seven square feet allowed
previously. 157
Conditions such as these are only part of the reason the Federation
cannot abolish the death penalty as quickly as Europe would prefer, because
the solution to the death penalty debate implies that prisoners would be
given life sentences in institutions that are already unfit for human survival.
Perhaps more frightening than the prison system itself is the criminal
justice system. From the initial arrest until the sentencin, the process is
staggeringly grim. Close to 300,000 inmates await trial. 1  The time they
will spend in prison before trial is entirely uncertain. According to Justice
Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov, there are no legal limits on how long a
person can be detained before a trial. 159 The average detention is ten
months, 16 but some reports allege that a person can wait as long as four
151 See Reynolds, supra note 79.
152 See id.
153 See Alessandra Stanley, Russians Lament the Crime of Punishment, N. Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1998, at Al.
154 See id.
'55 See id.
156 See id. at Al, A6.
'57 See id. at A6.
15 See id. at Al.
159 See About 1000 People in Russia Face Death Penalty, Interfax Russian News,
Aug. 12, 1998, available in LEXIS, Country & Region (excluding U.S.) Library.
160 See Stanley, supra note 153, at A6.
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years before going to trial. 16 1 The problem is that while prosecutors are
required to complete their investigations within two years, there are no time
limits for judges to hear the cases. Therefore, judges may leave detainees
in prison indefinitely.
Once the accused is finally heard in court, the ordeal does not improve.
Because Russia follows the inquisitorial model, judges are required to
perform much of the information-gathering that would normally be done by
the lawyers in the adversarial system. Russia has a conviction rate of almost
100% due in part because the judge must do an enormous amount of work
such as solicit witness and expert testimony, review evidence and request
information before he can acquit. 162 Judges have little incentive to do
anything beyond minimal work. Unlike other countries, being appointed as
a judge is not an illustrious position to hold in Russia. In 1997 judi
finally received a salary raise of 65% to bring them up to $550 a month.
With these wages, it not surprising that one-third of the benches in Moscow
courts are vacant and many posts are filled by junior lawyers.
164
Furthermore, the courts are consistently battling corruption, which has led
to more than 322 iudges being ousted from their positions in the last three
and a half years.1  Corruption will continue to be a factor as long as there
are supplemental sources of income available to judges. For example,
granting bail is a novelty that is granted to less than 2% of the accused,
"usually to mobsters who have ready cash and connections to a compliant
judge."166 The physical conditions of the courts themselves indicate further
reasons why judges are remiss in their duties. Some court buildings have no
heat,' 67 and most have no computers to aid judges in quickly accessing
relevant precedent and law. 
168
Once the prisoner has been sentenced to death, he will usually spend
some time in a maximum security prison awaiting his fate. The prisoner has
no idea when or where he will be executed. Execution is a simple and
inexpensive procedure: a simple shot to the back of the head. 169 The bodies
are cremated and the prisoner's family is not permitted to recover the
161 See id. at Al.
162 See id. at A6.
163 See Stem Graft, Spend More on Courts, Moscow TIMES, July 31, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Russia File.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See Stanley, supra note 153, at A6.
167 See Irina Dmitrievna, Court Staff to Quit over Firing Threat, MOscowTIMES, Oct.
20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Russia File.
168 See Stem Graft, Spend More on Courts, supra note 164.
169 See Kraft, supra note 33, at Al.
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ashes. 17 Prisoners are not told until the second before they are shot that
they are about to be executed in order to avoid "panic or stress."' 17 1 The
procedure seems rather crude and ad hoc, but prisoners have repeatedly
asked to be executed rather than endure the long, agonizing, and inhumane
walk down the path to death row. Clearly, the most pragmatic and
productive solution to the Russian dilemma is a massive overhaul
encompassing all aspects of criminal law and procedure.
3. Ignore the Council for the Time Being
The final option seems the most likely to occur, at least for the time
being. Russia may choose to retain the death penalty, employ it when
appropriate and ignore the Council's demands certainly until the ideological
tide of the Russian public has changed or until crime is curbed. Russia
could take the risk and ignore the Council a while longer in the way
Romania has done for the past five years. As a member of the Council,
Romania, too, was asked to sign a ban on torture, but the country has still
been accused of persecution and torture of political prisoners. 172 The
foreign minister of Romania made no excuses, asserting that his country
simply could not agree with the Council's requirements. 173 The Council's
credibility was severely criticized when its response was merely an
expression of concern at the lack of legal reform.' 74 There is some support
among Russian government officials for the abolition of the death penalty.
These supporters are Russia's representatives to the Parliamentary
Assembly who have attempted to influence the Duma's discussions on the
topic. These abolitionists are not in the majority among their peers in the
Russian parliament. As a solution, ignoring the Council's many demands
and warnings will entail the least effort but it will also incur the greatest
risk to Russia's national and international interests.
II. CONCLUSION
In order to move the Russian Federation to a point with which the
European community can comfortably welcome Russia, Europe must
redirect its energies and help Russia develop a penal system and a criminal
justice system that is more closely aligned with what are considered
generally accepted standards within the contexts of human rights in Europe
and the West. This is by far a better alternative than threatening Russia with
expulsion.
170 See id.
171 See id. at A6.
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The Council should refocus its efforts not because all of the current
outcomes attained are inherently incorrect or, by European standards
"unconscionable," but because the processes often obscure the goals of the
justice system. Perhaps, then, abolition of the death sentence will follow,
but it is useless to demand that Russia place the cart before the horse. If the
processes themselves are flawed or suspect, society may be cheated from
just or equitable results, whether the result is life imprisonment or death.
Russia should not be expelled from the Council. Russia's main
objective in seeking membership to the Council of Europe was to use it as a
vehicle toward closer ties with the E.U. Assuming membership and
approval from the Council is a stepping stone, Russia will now try to join
the E.U. It will not succeed in the near future. The European Union does
not expect to expand within the next few years.' 75 Currently, the E.U. is
preparing for January 1999 when the economic union will take place. Any
future expansion plans will necessarily depend on the outcome of the union.
If Russia is to have a chance at membership into the E.U., it cannot afford
to lose its membership in the Council of Europe. It would behoove Western
Europe to reign in the Russian Federation and other former Soviet states in
order to ensure future closer ties with these states, whether in the form of
E.U. membership or otherwise and to continue to further the Council's
human rights goals.
There is some controversy over Russia's current membership, as well
as questions regarding the Federation's commitment to issues like the death
penalty. It is true that by some accounts over forty Russian Federation laws
contradict the Council's Human Rights and Basic Freedoms Convention.
176
It is also true that the Minister of Justice has made numerous statements
regarding the unlikelihood that Russia will abolish the death penalty.
177
Similarly, the Russian delegation to the Council has yet to express the
determination the Council expects for compliance on the many obligations
the Federation has yet to fulfil, and many European delegates to the
Council have openly accused Russia of making empty promises. 178 Many of
the Russian representatives are abolitionists, but there is little they can do to
influence the decision-makers in Moscow. It is understandable that the
Council is impatient with Russia after almost three years since the
175 Cf. Blocker, supra note 17 (noting the likelihood that E.U. membership for some
Eastern European nations could take two decades).
176 See Duma Ratifies Human Rights Convention, Keeps Death Penalty, supra note 44.
177 Justice Minister Pavel Krashennikov has contradicted himself in the media on
numerous occasions. On at least two occasions, Krashennikov stated that it was
premature for Russia to abolish the death penalty and that Russia should preserve it
because of the current crime situation. See Sukhova, supra note 82. Yet, as a condition
of admission to the Council of Europe, the Russian government agreed to abolish the
death penalty. See Stanley, supra note 153, at A6.
178 See Mikheyev, supra note 49.
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Federation was granted membership. However, if the Council hopes to
bring Russia closer into the European community, threats of expulsion will
not achieve that goal. More importantly, if the Council hopes to bring
about, as the ultimate result, the abolition of the death penalty, Russia
should not be expelled from the Council. This would almost assure
retention of the punishment for a much longer period of time than may
otherwise be the case under European influence.
As it stands, the Council's threats have thus far fallen on deaf ears in
the Duma. But even the Duma realizes the importance of maintaining ties
with western Europe. As one government official said, "Membership in the
Council of Europe definitely meets the interests of Russia."' if the
Federation is expelled from the Council, not only will it be humiliated, but
will lose an initial opportunity to further link itself to European trade.
Furthermore, considering the Council's attitude toward other founding
nations including Great Britain, who has yet to eliminate the death penalty
from its statute books, the Council loses some credibility by demanding that
Russia sign the Protocol immediately.180 Russia legitimately complains that
the Council has been excessively pushy with the Federation and that the
Council maintains a double standard considering the fact that the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe literally waited decades
for Great Britain to sign Protocol No. 6, banning the death penalty.18 1 One
Russian minister to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council noted
during a debate that the abolition of the death penalty must take a number
of years, otherwise, the punishment would have been abolished in all the
original Member States immediately after the Council's creation in 1949.182
In fact, by early 1999, there were still nine other members that had yet to
ratify the Protocol and five members that had not yet signed it.1
8 3
The current Russian criminal and social crisis creates an added
difficulty for compliance with the Council's immediate demands.'84 As one
Russian member of the Council implored, "[m]ore caution [is] needed. If
179 See Duma Ratifies Human Rights Convention, Keeps Death Penalty, supra note 44.
180 See Owen Bowcott & Stephen Bates, End of the Line for Death Penalty, GUARDIAN
(Manchester, England), Oct. 4, 1997.
181 See Sukhova & Dymarsky, supra note 60. Many other members of the Council
have also failed thus far to ratify or sign the Protocol, including Malta and Cyprus.
Additionally, several other states are merely de facto abolitionists, not having removed
the death penalty from their statutes: Belgium, Turkey, Latvia, Albania, Estonia, and
others. Great Britain retains the death penalty for offenses dating back to 1351 such as
murdering the Monarch and killing the Lord Chancellor. See Bowcott & Bates, supra
note 181.
182 See Execution of Death Sentences in Russia and Ukraine, supra note 24.
183 See Council of Europe Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 8.
184 See generally Joseph M. Jones, Russia's Trial by Fire, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1995,
at 8, 9 (recognizing the "enormity and complexity" of the changes occurring in Russia).
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the Council of Europe were to apply sanctions, it would lead to hardship...
[I]t [is] important not to destabilise an already unstable position."18 Even
if the death penalty is truly not a significant deterrent in Russia, there is
something to be said for the psychological comfort citizens derive from
believing that the punishment is a tool for crime-control. Indeed, Russians
yearn for the authorities to be tough on crime, perhaps a socio-historical as
well as psychological comfort to those who remember the crime-free Stalin
era.186 While this may not be an acceptable justification for the Council of
Europe, Russia must deal with these political and social realities.
As stated earlier, the polls suggest that the overwhelming majority of
Russians support the death sentence. 87 If this is so, Russia not only faces a
social dilemma, but a legal one as well. Can the Council ask the Russian
government to implement a new law that directly contradicts public
sentiment almost unanimously? Considering the fragile political state of the
government, the abolition of the death penalty is not merely a simple
change in a country's penal code, but a dangerous risk to political stability
in an already fragile environment. While the Council should help Russia
develop procedural postures that may later develop into discussions of
appropriate sentencing, it should also realize that, as with all international
covenants, compliance and enforcement are only as effective as the parties
agree they are. Russia is a sovereign nation whose most important
constituency is not at the seat of the Council in Strasbourg but at home. The
Council should not be so inflexible so as to ignore its members' specific
situations.
Finally, membership into the Council is voluntary; therefore, the
Council can legitimately mandate specific compliance from its members or
establish prerequisites for membership. There is even some indication that
the death penalty is not a critical issue for membership to the European
Union. 188 For example, Britain's ambassador to the European Union has
stated that keeping capital punishment in Estonian laws is not necessarily
an obstacle to entry into the E.U.189 If the abolition of the death penalty is
not a priority for membership to the E.U., then perhaps the Council need
not inflate the issue at this time. Furthermore, if Russia is unable to fulfill
obligations that the Council finds truly imperative then the Council should
185 Execution of Death Sentences in Russia and Ukrainesupra note 24.
186 See Womack, supra note 86; see also Kushen, supra note 32; Reynolds, supra note
79.
187 See Maura Reynolds, Russian, Ukrainian Presidents Face Uphill Battle to Abolish
Death Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 15, 1998.
188 See British Ambassador: E. U. Does Not Insist on Abolition of Death Penalty in
Estonia, Baltic News Service, Mar. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8546712 (proposing
that it is likely Estonia would still be seriously considered for membership to the E.U.
despite its retention of the death penalty).
189 See id.
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also reconsider the membership status of several other members who have
likewise failed to honor their commitments. If the council is not willing to
review other's memberships, then what Russia may be dealing with is a
regional bully instead of an organization dedicated to the betterment of the
European states and the protection of human fights.

